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The Transformation of the U.S. Labor Market:
Causes and Prospects
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
As the world's first technological society, the economy of the United
States has often been confronted with the need to adapt to dynamic
circumstances.
,
Achieving its independence in the same year (1776) that James
Watt introduced his steam engine, the United States was literally "born
running" with the Industrial Revolution. While the mechanization of
production did not begin in the United States, it was the first country to
capitalize on its revolutionary potential.
From its beginnings until the early 20th Centuries, the nation was
primarily an agriculturally-based economy. Even as the economy began to
mechanize during the last half of the 19th Century, the employment
requirements of both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors demanded
little in the way of skill or knowledge from its work force. Most job seekers
possessed little of either. It was simply assumed that the labor force could
somehow adjust to the technologically imposed requirements of the job. An
essentially open-door immigration policy (except for Asians) provided an
abundant number of unskilled workers.
With the coming of the second decade of the Twentieth Century, the
historic development of the continuous process production techniques
(associated with the advent of the assembly line in the automobile industry
in 1914 and its subsequent replication in the 1920s by other manufacturing
2industries) only served to exacerbate the prevailing employment patterns.
It did not alter them. The economy of the United States was still in its
adolescence. Mass production provided a means to produce goods and to offer
them at low cost to a consuming public who at the time largely possessed
very few material goods. Millions of unskilled blue-collar production jobs
were created largely in manufacturing, mining and construction. Agriculture
remained a significant employing sector even though its historic dominance
was finally eclipsed by manufacturing in 1920. Most of these newly created
jobs still required little in the way of human capital endowments from most
job seekers.
A review of Table 1, for the period 1890 to 1930 shows, however, that
the labor force adjustment to mechanization and continuous process was far
from painless. Unemployment rates fluctuated wildly and the economy of this
era was subject to frequent swings of the business cycle. It was a period
of prolonged instability. But it was in the 1930s that the nation was beset
by the worst economic depression in its history. Immigration, which had
been restricted from Europe in 1924, essentially ceased from all sources.
With an abundance of unemployed citizen labor available, there was no need
to be concerned about human resource development. The most enduring policy
accomplishment of this period was the recognition of the necessity of the
federal government to manage the aggregate level of employment of the economy.
The support for this position was provided by the English economist, John
M. Keynes. He criticized the prevailing academic teachings of se1f-
correcting labor markets for not reflecting the reality of prevailing
circumstances. In a world of large corporations, trade unions, tariff
barriers, and social welfare policies, the assumptions of classical economics
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3were simply irrelevant. Aside from criticism, however, Keynes offered a
new approach. He showed that the only way for an advanced capitalist economy
to avoid the periodic dislocations associated with the swings of the business
cycle was for the federal government to use its massive powers to alter taxes
and spending levels. These prescriptions were called fiscal policy. They
have been pursued by all political administrations ever since. Since the
1940s, the U.S. economy has been free of the extreme volatility that
characterized the preceding eras of its economic history (see Table 1).
As revolutionary as were the assumptions and policy prescriptions of
Keynes, his analysis had nothing to say about the qualitative nature of the
supply of labor. The macroeconomic theory that has evolved from Keynes'
initial analysis was and is premised upon the singular importance of labor
demand. It refers only to the application of fiscal policy to manipulate
the aggregate purchasing power of society.
Ironically, Keynes was fully aware of the limitations of his proposals.
He stressed the fact that his analysis was purely a short run diagnosis.
He once quipped that "in the long run we are all dead." His theory,
therefore, was based on the assumption that the size of the labor force,
the capital stock (both human and physical), the state of technology, the
degree of competition, (domestic and foreign), and the consumer tastes for
goods and services are all assumed to be constant. In the short run, such
assumptions may be acceptable; but over the long run they clearly are not.
He described these other factors as composing the "social structure" that
"determines the distribution of national income." In other words, Keynes
recognized that unemployment can be caused by changes in the structure of
the economy and that such changes would require policy responses other than
4fiscal policy.
The 1940s and the 1950s were dominated by the events associated with
World War II and its aftermath. The massive military spending by the federal
government during the war became the applied fiscal policy of this era.
Full employment was achieved. Government spending was responsible for a
dramatic increase in the capacity of the u.s. economy to produce output.
The scale of mass production techniques increased dramatically. But the
employment requirements of the past were not changed. The bulk of the jobs
that were created were of an unskilled and semi-skilled nature. Indeed,
it is alleged that the hiring philosophy of the automobile industry during
this era was that "if the job applicant is warm and breathing we will hire
him (or her)". Its hard to imagine a lower threshold to employment.
One new element, however, was added during the World War II era. It
was the commitment to research and development to find new military weapons
by all of the nations who were participants. In the U.S., the scale of the
research build-up created a scientific and technological base that was carried
over to the post-war economy. The Cold War that began with the Soviet Union
in the late 1940s meant that the high level of military expenditures continued
as did the commitment by the government to support scientific research.
On the domestic side, fully one-third of the U.S. population moved into the
middle class during the war years. As a result, a new consumer class emerged
after the war to buy the expanded output of these newly acquired productive
capacities and technological capabilities and to perpetuate temporarily the
employment patterns of the past.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, there were signs of problems
with the ability of the labor force to adjust to emerging changes in the
5economy. Unemployment rates began to rise (see Table 1). Unlike the general
unemployment of the 1930s that affected workers across industrial,
occupational and regional lines, however, the new pattern of unemployment
was more selective. Workers in manufacturing industries, blue collar
occupations, and certain geographic regions seemed to be most affected.
Fears of the effects of recently introduced automatic control types of
production techniques -- called automation -- were cited as being a probable
culprit. Spawned also in part by the launching of Sputnik I in 1957 by the
Soviet Union, the United States took the first tentative steps toward a
national human resource development policy. Major legislature and
administrative policies were initiated in the employment area pertaining
to federal government support for occupational training, on-the-job training,
federal aid to education (from pre-school to graduate school), assistance
for industry relocation, social rehabilitation, vocational education,
apprenticeship, direct job creation and aid for regional economic development.
The movement toward institutionalizing human resource development as
a permanent feature of national economic policy, however, soon was snipped
in the bud by two separate happenings. One was the coming of the Vietnam
War. The worrisome employment patterns that had caused the initial concern
for new policy interventions were temporarily reversed. Both the
manufacturing sector and blue collar occupations -- which had been declining
for over a decade -- were revived due the sharp increase in defense and
defense-related spending. The original clientele for many of these endeavors
-- the displaced semi-skilled worker with work experience -- appeared to
have vanished. In addition, the military draft was increased tenfold between
1964 and 1965 -- the exact year that the postwar baby boom hit the major
6labor force entry age of eighteen. Sharp declines in the overall unemployment
rate occurred in the late 1960s (review Table 1). The second diversion was,
ironically, the legislative success of the civil rights movement as manifested
by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After the initial euphoria
associated with its enactment had passed and once the political and social
barriers to black participation in American society quickly dissipated, the
monumental challenges to the achievement of economic equality became starkly
vivid. The concept of equal employment opportunity embodied in the Act and
subsequently pursued by affirmative action policies assumed that minorities
were already qualified fo;r available jobs. Some were. But too often, the
legacy of past denial of opportunities to acquire sufficient human resource
preparation had left many unqualified, uninformed, unaspiring and
disproportionately concentrated in declining industries and occupations.
In the wake of the massive human resource development deficiencies that had
been forced upon the black population by past de jure and de facto
discrimination, the Johnson Administration shifted the thrust of the new
human resource programs to serve the employment needs of the "economically
disadvantaged." This was an historic policy turning point.
When U.S. involvement in the Vietnam began to wane in the early 1970s,
the pre-Vietnam trends in employment re-surfaced. Aggregate unemployment
increased (review Table 1). The publicly supported employment and training
programs, however, continued to focus on the needs of "economically
disadvantaged" workers. Ostensibly, they were for persons from low income
families without regard to race. But as minorities were disproportionately
concentrated in the low income population, they had become disproportionately
the clientele. In the process, the publicly supported training programs
7acquired a stigmatizing image that implied that such human resource programs
were only for those people unable to help themselves. As a consequence,
when the Reagan Administration came to power in 1981 with a determination
to reduce federal spending on social programs, these undertakings did not
have a politically powerful enough constituency to withstand the assault.
The programs were drastically reduced in both their substance and in their
level of financial support. These efforts even included an attempt to abolish
the U.S. Department of Education. In their place, fiscal policy measures
in the form of dramatic across the board tax cuts for consumers and business
became the preferred approach. It has been this path that has been followed
in the 1980s. Even as late as 1987, the Administration's budget proposals
called for a total withdrawal of federal support for vocational education.
Fiscal policy, however, does not do anything to make unemployed people
employable. It assumes that the problem is essentially one of lack of jobs.
Given the stimulative spending effects of tax cuts, it is assumed that the
private sector will take the responsibility for training and retraining the
work force to meet the added demand provided by tax cuts for their output.
Indeed private industry does spend in the neighborhood of $40 billion a year
on training but virtually all of this is earmarked from upgrading people
who have already been hired. Seldom is private support given to the equally
important need of preparing people to qualify for jobs or for retraining
or relocating those who have lost their jobs for employment elsewhere.
Unfortunately, the labor market problems of the 1980s are not those
of the 1930s. Unemployment did not go down in 1981 when the tax cuts were
adopted or in 1982 when they were enacted. To the contrary, it went up to
the highest levels sustained since the 1930s. Even when they began to
8decline in 1983, they have remained in a range higher than the levels
sustained throughout most of the post-World War II era (see Table 1).
Moreover, the numbers of discouraged workers (1.2 million for the first
quarter of 1987) and involuntarily part-time employed people (5.5 million
for March, 1987) have also followed this worrisome pattern.
The long term indicator that something is seriously awry is the
continuing upward drift of the unemployment rate -- especially during periods
of general prosperity. (See the secular trend line in Table 1 for the period
1950 to 1986). It appears that the economy is encountering stiff resistance
to its adjustment capabilities. Indeed, careful study suggests that the
labor market is being transformed.
The Nature of the Transformation
The shifting structural changes in the labor market of the United States
are to be found in the continuing decline of employment in the goods producing
sector (manufacturing in particular) and the growth of employment in the
service sector (see Table 2); the occupational shift from production and
non-supervisory jobs toward non-production and supervisory employment in
every industrial sector (see Table 3); and the geographic shift in employment
and population from the Northeast and Midwest toward the selected urban areas
of the South and West (see Tables 4 and 5 respectively). These emerging
patterns are but the symptoms of the transformation of employment
opportunities. The data in these tables show that the goods producing sector
now accounts for only 25 percent of the employed persons in non-agricultural
jobs in the United States; the proportion of non production or supervisory
jobs in every industrial s,ector is increasing substantially; employment growth
is occurring disproportionately in the West and the South; and the population
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1986
Industry
Goods Producing
Mining 901 712 623 1,027 792
Construction 2,364 2,926 3,588 4,346 4,961
Manufacturing 15,241 16,796 19,367 20,285 19,961
Service Producing
Transportation and
Public Utilities 4,034 4,004 4,515 5,146 5,285
Wholesale Trade 2,635 3,143 3,993 5,275 5,853
Retail Trade 6,751 8,248 11,047 15,035 17,976
Finance, Ins.,
Real Estate 1,888 2,629 3,645 5,160 6,304
Personal Services 5,357 7,378 11,548 17,890 23,073
Government 6,026 8,353 12,554 16,241 16,738
8a
Table 2: Nonagricultural Industrial Employment, Selected Years
(in thousands of persons)
Sources: Economic Report of the President, 1986.
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1986
Industry
Goods Producing
Mining 9.4 19.9 24.1 25.8 29.0
Construction 11.1 14.7 16.7 21.3 17.0
Manufacturing 17.8 25.1 27.5 29.9 32.0
Servicing Producing
Transportation and
Public Utilities N.A. N.A. 13.3 16.6 17.0
Wholesale Trade 9.6 13.9 16.6 18.2 19.8
Retail Trade 5.6 7.5 9.1 10.2 11.1 .
Finance, Ins.,
Real Estate 17.1 18.4 21.0 24.3 26.2
Personal Services N.A. N.A. 9.2 11.0 12.2
N.A. = Not Available
8b
Table 3: Percentage of Employees in Private Sector Who Are Employed
in Non-Production or Supervisory Occupations
(percentage terms)
Source: Employment and Training Report of the President, 1982 and Employment and
Earnings, (January, 1987).
Table 4: Distribution of Non-Agricultural Employment
By Census Divisions, 1973 and 1985
Percent
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New
England
Mid
Atlantic
East
North
Central
South
Atlantic
West
North
Central
East
South
Central
West Mountain
South
Central
Pacific
Census regions and divisions
Northeast South-Continued
New England West Virginia
Maine North Carolina
New Hampshire South Carolina
Vermont Georgia
Massachusetts Aori~a
Rhode Island
Connecticut
Middle Atlantic
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
East South Central
Kentucky
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
West SOUihCentral
Arkansas
Louisiana
OkJahoma
Texas
Midwest
East North Central
Ohio
Indiana
llIinois
MiclUgan
Wisconsin
West
Mountain
Montana
Wyoming
Colorado
Utah
Idaho
Arizona
Nevada
New Mexico
West North Central
Iowa
Missouri
Nebraska
Kansas
Minnesota
North Dakota
South Dakota Pacific
California
Hawaii
Washington
Oregon
Alaska
Source:
South
South Atlantic
Delaware
Maryland
District of Columbia
Virginiau.S. Department of Labor
Be
Percent
25
20
15
10
5
0
NEW ENGLAND 12,549,332 1.6% WEST SOUTH CENTRAL 26,711 ,505 12.5
Connecticut 3,160,280 1.7 Arkansas 2,345,431 2.6
Maine 1,156,539 2.8 Louisiana 4,553,903 8.3
Massachusetts 5,764,125 0.5 Oklahoma 3,427,371 13.3
New Hampshire 980,841 6.5 Texas 16,384,800 15.2
Rhode Island 958,151 1.2 SOUTH ATLANTIC 39,630,108 7.2
Vermont 529,396 3.5 Delaware 605,711 2.4
MIDDLEATLANTIC 37,081,754 0.8 District of Columbia 621,251 -2.7
New Jersey 7,509,625 2.0 Florida 11 ,071 ,358 13.6
New York 17,676,828 0.7 Georgia 5,878,225 7.6
Pennsylvania 11,895,301 1.2 Maryland 4,342,562 3.0
EAST NORTHCENTRAL 41,539,910 -0.3 North Carolina 6,178,329 5.0
Illinois 11 ,502,433 0.7 South Carolina 3,321,520 6.4
Indiana 5,489,287 None Virginia 5,642,183 5.5
Michigan 8,992,766 -2.9 West Virginia 1,968,969 1.0
Ohio 10,763,309 -0.3 MOUNTAIN 12,770,740 12.3
Wisconsin 4,792,115 1.8 Arizona 3,086,827 13.6
WEST NORTHCENTRAL 17,555,598 2.2 Colorado 3,253,425 12.6
Iowa 2,894,273 -0.7 Idaho 1,004,071 6.4
Kansas 2,453,581 3.8 Montana 826,933 5.1
Minnesota 4,199,749 4.0 Nevada 933,451 16.6
Missouri 5,004,162 1.8 New Mexico 1,446,347 11.0
Nebraska 1,606,779 2.4 Utah 1,684,942 15.3
North Dakota 692,027 6.0 Wyoming 534,744 13.9
South Dakota 705,027 2.1 PACIFIC 34,428,014 8.3
EAST SOUTHCENTRAL 15,098,605 2.9 Alaska 514,819 28.1
Alabama 4,004,435 2.8 California 25,816,590 9.1
Kentucky 3,747,769 2.4 Hawaii 1,050,270 8.9
Mississippi 2,623,069 4.1 Oregon 2,680,087 1.8
Tennessee 4,723,332 2.9 Washington 4,366,248 5.7
Sources: Dun & Bradstreet, Census Bureau
8d
Table 5: Population Growth by State, 1980 to 1985
A STATE-BY-STATE BREAKDOWN
1985
population
% change
1980-85
1985
population
% change
1980-85
Source: New York Times, April 28, 1985, p. 30 [based on U.S. Census Data]
9is growing in a very uneven pattern (e.g., Texas, California and Florida
account for half the total population growth between 1980 and 1985 while
farm belt states like Iowa and former manufacturing oriented states like
Michigan and Ohio have experienced absolute declines of population over this
time span). In most regions, the greatest population growth is taking place
in areas around big-cities -- i.e., in the suburbs and in small metropolitan
areas. The urban city centers appear to be in a state of chronic stagnation
or decay.
Careful analysis of the adjustment problems of the U.S. labor force
are seriously hampered by the gross limitations of data. There is no official
index of job vacancies. Only an index of help-wanted advertisements for
51 labor markets that is calculated by The Conference Board of New York
exists. It registered a reading of 139 in 1985 (1967=100) -- the highest
such reading since 1978. This at least suggests that filling vacant jobs
is a problem. Unemployment rates by occupations (a measure limited to
assigning unemployment on the basis of "last attachment", not longest
experience) does indicate that the former workers in the lowest skilled
occupations had double digit unemployment rates in 1985 (e.g., construction
laborers, 21.3 percent; handlers and cleaners, 14.3 percent; and farmworkers,
8.3 percent). The comparable rates for the occupations associated with higher
skill and education requirements were very low (e.g., managers and
professionals, 2.4 percent; technicians 3.3 percent; mechanics 4.8 percent).
These figures, of course, do not include former workers in these industries
who have become discouraged from continuing job search nor do they include
new labor force entrants or those re-entering after lengthy withdrawals from
the labor force. Nonetheless, the extreme differences in these rates does
10
suggest that there are serious shortages of workers for the skilled
occupations and a considerable surplus of workers for the low skilled
occupations.
An examination of data on educational attainment of the labor force
shows a considerable inverse relationship between unemployment and years
of schooling. In 1985, 35.6 percent of the unemployed labor force had
completed less than high school and, if those who completed only high school
are added, the percentage soars to 79.2 percent of the unemployed. College
graduates, in turn accounted for 4.8 percent of the unemployed and those
with more than four years of college accounted for only 2.1 percent of the
unemployed. Although these figures also have limitations, they do indicate
the existence of a substantial number of unemployed workers with limited
educational attainment. The educational deficiency problem is much worse
when allowances are made for actual educational achievement since it has
been recently reported that 700,000 high school graduates in 1986, "could
not read the writing on their diplomas." Conversely, those with more years
of education are clearly the ones who are most sought. Some of these figures
are no doubt reflective of a credentialing effect, rather than necessarily
indicative of actual job requirements, but the magnitudes are so great that
it is unlikely that they do not reflect the obvious.
Collectively, the economy seems to be generating two types of opposite
job creation patterns -- both of which are causing adjustment problems.
One trend is a generation of good paying and desireable jobs that require
higher skills, more education and some mobility to fill. The other is the
creation of more jobs in the low skill end of the spectrum. But, in stark
contrast to past experience, even the less desireable jobs require more in
11
the way of communication, verbal and literacy skills than many would-be
workers in this new era seem to possess. Hence, there are imbalances in
the labor market. The types of jobs that are increasing most rapidly at
both ends of the labor market are those for which a growing number of U.S.
workers are either unavailable or unqualified to fill.
The Causal Factors
The transformation of the labor market is the product of a series of
unprecedented economic developments that are occurring simultaneously.
These happenings include the accelerating influences that science and
technology are assuming as determinants of economic change. As Robert
Hei1broner has so poignant1y written, "the extraordinary predominance of
technology is the decisive characteristic of modern times." But they also
involve a number of major changes in the domestic and international economic
environment of the United States that provide the background against which
the new character of labor demand is being shaped. These background forces
are influencing -- perhaps even retarding -- the ability of the supply of
labor to respond to the new realities of changing labor demand. The influence
of these factors requires recognition if the design of public policy is to
be appropriate to the challenge of meeting the quantum changes in employment
patterns that this transformation in causing. New forces for change will
require fresh perspectives that are free from the intellectual and political
barnacles of how things use to be done and which societal institutions have
historically had the responsibilities for preparing the work force for
employment. New roles for government, business, labor, and education will
be required. There are few lessons in the past that will help the adjustment
of the economy to its new circumstances.
12
The Changing Economic Background
There are at least four key differences in the economic background of
the U.S. economy in the 1980s that represent major departures from past
experiences. Each of these developments is a complete subject itself for
a conference so it will only be possible to briefly state why each is of
vital consequence to an understanding of the nations of the transformation.
The Mature Stage of Economic Development. Walt Rostow has pointed out
that in mature technologically-oriented societies, people take for granted
the type of societies into which they are born. Hence, there is a tendency
to overlook the fact that the current stage of U.s. economic development
represents an economy that is a far cry from what existed in the past. As
Adali Stevenson once said, "people forget that the light of our founding
fathers was the candle and the means of transportation was the horse."
One of the key differences, as Rostow notes, of post-industrial societies
is an expansion of personal consumption beyond the provision of basic food,
shelter, and clothing requirements into a vast array of new economic wants
that are provided by non-tangible service production. In its first century
as a nation, the expenditure patterns of the economy of the U.S. were
primarily focused toward providing non-durable goods (food and fiber); by
tQe end of the 19th century and throughout the first half of the 20th Century,
the economy shifted its expenditures toward durable production. By the mid-
1950s, however, the change toward an emphasis on the production of services
was pronounced and it has clearly been the case since that time. The shift
in consumption patterns (i.e., consumer tastes) has meant a shift in
employment patterns. There are very few subjects about which one can place
trust in the ability of economists to predict, but there is one sure bet.
13
Namely, the sectors where money is spent are those where employment will
increase (and visa versa). Hence, there has been a marked shift in employment
patterns away from durable and non-durable sectors toward the service sector.
In 1986, 75 percent of the U.S. employed non-agricultural labor force was
in the service sector and the U.S. Department of Labor predicts that this
"
,
pattern will continue'to accelerate. Indeed, it predicts that 90 percent
of the jobs to be created in the U.S. between now and 1995 will be in the
service sector.
The shift to employment in the service sector is a distinctive feature
of the transformation of U.S. economy. There is, however, a pervasive myth
that needs to be debunked: it is that service sector jobs are dead-end and
low paying. Some are, of course, but so are some in the goods producing
sector (e.g., those in agriculture and textile manufacturing). The reality
is that 80 percent of the professional and managerial jobs in the entire
economy are to be found in the service sector. While it is true that there
are growing service employment opportunities in such low paying industries
as fast-foods and nursing home care, there are also substantial employment
increases being realized in high-paying jobs in computer services, legal
services and advertising as well as in average-paying jobs in insurance,
wholesale trade, and auto repairing.
In its projections of occupational growth to the year 1995, however,
the Department of Labor forecasts a considerable departure from past trends.
The managerial, professional, and technicians occupations -- all of which
require post-secondary levels of education -- are expected to growth much
faster than the projected average growth rate for total employment. Indeed,
of the 20 occupations projected to be the fastest growing, half are related
14
to the growing computer and health fields. In general, the shift to a
service-based economy will lead to an upgrading of the skill and educational
requirements of the labor force from what hitherto ever existed before.
Of particular consequence is the fact that the upgrading in the job
requirements will affect all types of jobs -- high, intermediate, and low
skilled.
It is in this context that the recent revelations about the prevalence
of adult illiteracy are especially ominous. These studies have reported
in that as many as 23 million adults are totally or functionally illiterate
and that another 23 million adults are only marginally literate at best.
Other studies released have placed these numbers even higher. The situation
is believed to be so severe that the National Commission on Excellence in
Education, appointed by President Ronald Reagan, concluded its 1983
comprehensive report by saying that the future welfare of the nation is "in
peril" and chose to entitle its report as A Nation at Risk.
The economic consequences of mounting adult illiteracy are much more
severe in the emerging service-oriented society than was the case when the
goods producing sector dominated the employment generation process. The
bulk of employment opportunities provided by the goods producing industries
in the first half of the Twentieth Century did not require much in the way
of educational and verbal skills from its job seekers. Thus, the literacy
gap has emerged at a time when changes in the labor market are placing a
premium on communication abilities. Service industries and technologically-
oriented businesses in the goods producing sector require workers to handle
comprehensive tasks which are often based more on reading, writing, listening
and speaking than on manipulative skills. Thus, there is an inherent threat
15
to the evolving viability of the economy due to widespread adult illiteracy.
It entails more than a loss in potential worker productivity due to the
limited availability of employment opportunities even in a service-oriented
economy. Adult illiteracy also contributes to the incidence of work place
accidents; the provision of poor quality products and services to customers;
and the loss of valuable management and supervisory time.
As if the number of functionally illiterate adults were not bad enough,
it is estimated that their ranks in the mid-1980s are actually swelling by
about 2.3 million persons a year. One cause of growing adult illiteracy
has been attributed to the declining standards of the nation's educational
institutions from elementary through college levels. Another has been the
epidemic of teenage pregnancies over the past decade which markedly
contributes to the school "drop-out" problem. Whatever the reasons, it is
estimated that about one million teenagers leave schools each year without
sufficient literacy skills. But the largest source of growth in the ranks
of the functionally illiterate is from the new wave immigrants who are
overwhelmingly coming from less economically developed nations. Many cannot
speak English and are often illiterate in their own native language. The
new immigration law (the Simpson-Rodino Act) that is being implemented this
year guarantees with its liberal amnesty provisions that this number of adult
illiterates will swell even more.
Thus, there is an urgent need to undertake a national program geared
to the attainment of educational competency. It is estimated in 1985 that
about 75 percent of the unemployed persons in the United States have
inadequate reading and writing skills. Until these basic deficiencies are
addressed, it is very difficult -- if not impossible -- to provide the related
16
skill acquisition needs of this significant segment of the adult population
in the newly developing U.S. labor market.
It was the recognition that United States does have serious literacy
and educational deficiency problems associated with its labor force that
led the Prime Minister of Japan, Yasuhiro Nakasone to make his infamous
remarks in 1986 that Japan is "an intelligent society" and that the U.S.
is not. While it was wrong of him to explain the difference purely in racial
terms (since most educational experts explain the performance differences
between the races more on environmental disadvantages that have confronted
certain minority groups than on inheritable genetic traits), statistically
speaking he was correct. There are marked differences in the performances
of different racial groups on educational tests; in the number of school
drop-outs; and in the incidence of adult illiteracy.
Indeed, another study of U.S. industrial competitiveness in 1983 stressed
the fact that knowledge accumulation is the key to the future development
of the U.S. economy. It too raised the spector that, unless major strides
are taken to improve educational performance in the United States, that "we
may consign our nation to the role of [becoming) the first great post-
industrial agrarian society."
The Agricultural Revolution. Although much of the attention on
technological change has focused on the factories and the offices of the
nation, a major revolution in applied technology and science has been
occurring in the agricultural sector for several decades. At the beginning
of the 19th century (1820 is the first year that such data is available),
72 percent of the labor force were employed in agriculture; by 1920, that
figure was 33 percent and by the mid-1980s it had fallen to less than 3
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percent. Not only is the, United States essentially self-sufficient in
agriculture, but agriculture has been a mainstay of U.S. export business -
- ranging in the neighborhood of $40 billion a year in the 1980s. So
productive has the agricultural sector of the economy become that it is in
real danger of wiping itself out. In the agricultural sector, free enterprise
principles have long ago been abandoned. Indeed, in 1987, 72.4 million acres
of land will be put.under government production controls whereby the farming
industry will be paid not to use this land. (This is an amount of land equal
to the size of the entire state of Arizona). Even this program, plus the
on-going agricultural price support programs, is not expected to have much
impact on agricultural prices. Other nations have replicated the highly
capital intensive agricultural techniques of the United States. Even
countries like ,India and Saudi Arabia are now food exporters. As a result
there in a world-wide glut of food staples.
Food production in the U.S. has become a form of agribusiness. It has
become a hi-tech industry. The number of farms continues to fall dramatically
(from 5.6 million farms in 1950 to about 2.2 million farms in 1986) while
the size of farms continues to increase (up from 213 acres in 1950 to 455
acres per farm in 1986).
The factors contributing to the productivity surge in agriculture have
come primarily from three sources. The first has been accumulative effects
of supportive government policies. Of particular continuing importance has
been the land grant university system that has had as one of its principle
missions the support and dissemination of research pertaining to virtually
every aspect of agricultural production. This system also accounts for almost
100 percent of the college degrees granted in agriculturally related fields
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of study and veterinary medicine. In addition to training and research.
government policy has supported virtually every other aspect of the
agricultural industry -- from providing land to settlers in the 19th century
to the provision of loans. subsidized electrification. irrigation projects.
and land reclamation in the 20th Century. The second source of agricultural
productivity gains has b'een derived from the development of advanced
production methodologies (i.e.. the development of chemical fertilizers.
pesticides. ?ybrid plants, breeding programs. as well as new ventures into
genetic engineering). The third factor has been the advances in the
mechanization of agricultural production. (e.g.. milking machines, picking
machines. incubators, tree shakers. and storage facilities).
With respect to employment. the number of agricultural workers has fallen
consistently since the end of World War II (from about 8 million in 1948
to fewer than 3 million in 1986). The decline has been the greatest for
those in the unskilled farmworker occupations. With the onset of
agribusiness. the employment patterns in agriculture -- except for the labor
intensive farming methods still used in the nation's perishable crops industry
-- have mirrored the trends that are operative in the remainder of the
economy. The surviving agricultural labor force is increasingly composed
of workers with skills and education.
As a consequence. this critical sector of the economy -- once the haven
for the employment of mass numbers of unskilled and poorly educated workers -
- has not produced a single net new job in over 40 years. In fact. it has
been a negative source of employment over this entire period. The displaced
agricultural workers -- who far out number those displaced to date from
manufacturing but for whom no publicly supported displaced worker policy
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was ever enacted -- have been forced to seek employment on a catch-as-catch-
can basis in the non-agricultural sector. Relatedly, the decline of
agricultural employment has had a ripple effect that has contributed to the
decline of the non-agricultural sectors of many rural economies.
Most rural communities have either not been inclined or been financially
unable to provide quality educational and training opportunities. Hence,
many of the displaced farm and rural workers have been ill-prepared for other
than those jobs on the lowest rungs of the non-farm economy.
Rapid Growth of the Labor Force. Unlike the labor force experience
of the other major industrial with whom the United States is a major
competitor, the labor force of the United States has since the mid-1970s
been expanding by about 2 million job seekers a year.
As shown in Table 6, the U.S. labor force increased from 93.7 million
to 115.4 million workers from 1975 to 1985 -- or by about 2 million net
additional workers a year. In terms of those actually able to find
employment, their numbers increased from 85.8 million to 107.1 million over
this same time span. But what is particularly noteworthy about this
astounding growth is that it has been a singular feature of the United States
economy. These trends are not to be found in comparisons with any of the
other major industrial powers of the free world (see Table 6). Of the nine
other countries, only Canada and Japan have shown any appreciable absolute
increases in the size of their labor force over the II-year period. Of far
greater significance is the fact that, with the exception of Japan, the other
nations have found it very difficult to convert labor force growth into
increasing employment opportunities. In the cases Germany and Great Britain,
the absolute sizes of their respective employed labor forces were actually
T.ble 6: Civili.n l.bor force, employment, and unemployment approximating U.S. concept~, 10 countries, 1975-85
i'ear
Labor force:
1975 .
1976 .
1977 .
1978 .
1979. . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .. .
1980 .
1981 .
1982 .
1983 .
1984 .
1985 .
tmployment:
1975 .
1976 .
1977 .
1978 .
1979. .. . . . . .. . . . . . ...
1950 .
1981 .
1982 .
1983 .
1984. . . . . . . . . ... . .. . .
1985 .
Uno;"'i>loyment:
1975 ..
1976 .
1977. . . . . . . .. . .
1978 .
1979 .
1960 .
1961 .
1962. . . . . .. . . .. . . .. .
1983 .
1984 .
1985. .. . . .. . . .. ... . .
Unemployment rate:
1975 .
1976 .
1977 .
1978 .
1979 .
1980 .
1981. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1982 .
1953 .
1964 .
1965 .
United
States
93,775
96,158
99,009
102,251
104,962
106,940
106,670
110,204
111,550
113,544
115,461
55,646
86,752
92,017
96,048
96,824
99,303
100,397
99,526
100,834
105,005
107,150
7,929
7,406
6,991
6,202
6,137
7,631'
6,273
10,678
10,717
8,539
6,312
6.5
7.7
7.1
6.1
5.8
7.1
7.6
9.7
9.6
7.5
7.2
Canada
9,974
10,203
10,500
10,695
11,231
11,573
11,904
11,958
12,183
12,399
12,639
9,284
9,477
9,651
9,987
10,395
10,708
11,006
10,644
10,734
11,000
11,311
690
726
849
908
836
665
698
1,314
1,448
1,399
1,326
6.9
7.1
6.1
8.3
7.4
7.5
7.5
11.0
11.9
11.3
10.5
Australia
[~umbers in thousands)
France
6,169
6,244
6,358
6,443
6,519
6,693
6,610
6,910
6,997
7,133
7,272
5,666
5,946
6,000
6,038
6,111
6,284
6,416
6,415
6,300
6,490
6,670
302
298
356
405
408
409
394
495
697
642
602
4.9
4.8
5.6
6.3
6.3
6.1
5.6
7.2
10.0
9.0
8.3
Japan
52,530
53,100
53,820
54,610
55,210
55,740
56,320
56,980
58,110
58,480
58,820
51,530
52,020
52,720
53,370
54,040
54,600
55,060
55,620
56,550
56,870
57,260
1,000
1,060
1,100
1,240
1,170
1,140
1,260
1,360
1,560
1,610
1,560
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.3
2.1
2.0
2.2
2.4
2.7
2.8
2.6
21,600
21,640
22,100
22,290
22,470
22,570
22,640
22,900
22,800
22,290
23,330
20,700
20,850
21.030
21,110
21,110
21,120
20,950
20,980
.20,840
20,980
20,910
900
990
1,070
1,160
1,360
1,450
1,690
1,920
1,960
2,310
2,420
4.2
4.5
4.8
5.3
6.1
6.4
7.5
8.4
8.6
9.9
10.4
Cermany
26,130
25,900
25,870
26,000
26,240
26,500
26,610
26,640
26,640
26,880
27,090
25,230
25,010
24-,970
25,130
25,460
25,730
25,520
25,060
24,650
24,790
24,960
690
590
900
670
750
770
1,090
1,560
1,990
2.090
2,130
3.4
3.4
3.5
3.4
3.0
2.9
4.1
5.9
7.5
7.8
7.9
Creat
Britain
25,130
25,290
25,430
25,620
25 , 710
25,670
25,870
25,860
26,010
26,530
26,960
24,000
23,610
23,840
24,040
24,360
24,100
23,190
.22,620
.
22,680
23,100'
23,420
1,130
1,450
1,590
1,550
1,350
1,770
2,660
3,060
3,330
3,430
-
3,540
4.5
5.9
6.3
6.2
5.3
6.6
10.4
11.6
12.8
12.9
13.1
Italy
20,060
20,300
20,530
20,630
20,910
21,210
21,410
21,450
21,610
21,680
21,800
19,460
19,600
19,600
19,870
20,100
20,360
20,450
20,430
20,470
20,390
20,490
610
700
740
760
810
830
920
1,020
.1,140
1,260
--
1,310
J(ether-
lands
4,620
4,690
4,950
5,010
5,100
5,290
5,500
5,560
5,720
5,740
5,690
4,570
4,630
4,700
4,nO
4,630
4,960
4,990
4,930
4,690
4,850
4,690
250
260
250
260
2iO
330
510
630
830
560
600
3.0
3.4
3.6
3.7
3.9
3.9
4.3
4.6
5.3
5.9
6.0
5.2
5.3
5.0
5.2
5.3
6.2
9.3
11.3
14.5
15.0
14.1
Sweden
4,123
4,149
4,168
4,203
4,262
4,312
4,326
4,350
4,369
4,365
4,418
4,056
4,083
4,093
4,109
4,174
4,226
4,218
4,213
4,218
4,249
4,293
67
66
is
94
68
66
108
137
151
136
125
1.6
1.6
1.8
2.2
2.1
2.0
2.5
3.1
3.5
3.1
2.6
~ote: Data for other nations have been adjusted to approximate U.S. labor force definitions. For delalls, see source below.
Source: Joyann" }Ioy, "Recent Trends in Unemplo)'rnent .,nd the Labor rorce, 10 Cou:1tries", r~nl:'I~ 1,,'l~or Re.vle",.(AU&Ust, 1985). pp. 13-14.
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smaller in 1985 than they were in 1975, i.e., they have sustained negative
growth in employment over the 10 year period with the result being soaring
unemployment. For France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, their employment
changes were barely positive over this lengthy time period and the ranks
of their unemployed also swelled. Canada and Australia have been able to
provide more jobs for their growing labor forces but not at sufficient rates
to keep their unemployment rates from significantly increasing. Even Japan
has sustained increases in unemployment but, because its unemployment rate
remains below what would be considered to be full employment by other
countries, there is no immediate cause for alarm about its economy's ability
to generate jobs.
While it is true that the U.S. economy has generated an enormous number
of jobs over this period, it has not been able to create enough jobs to reduce
its unemployment rate to levels that would have been deemed acceptable in
previous post-World War II periods.
The explanations for the rapid growth of the U.S. labor force are complex
but essentially they boil down to three developments. The first pertains
to the unprecedented increase in the female labor force participation --
especially by married women. The labor force participation rate of all women
has increased from 33.9 percent in 1950 to 54.4 percent in 1986; but it is
the growing participation rate of married women in general and married women
with children in particular that is the key new phenomenon. Single adult
women were usually in the labor market while married women and women with
children were not. But the participation rate of married women has risen
from 23.8 percent to 54.7 percent from 1950 to 1986 and the labor force rate
of women (married or not) with children under 18 years of age has grown from
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45.9 percent in 1975 to 54.7 in 1986 (for women with children under 3 years
of age it has risen from 34.1 percent to 50.8 percent over this same span).
Representing a social revolution in its own right, more women in both absolute
and relative terms have been entering and staying longer in the labor force
than at any previous time in the nation's history. Two out of every three
new labor market entrants over the past decade have been women and the same
percentage is forecast through 1995. No one can predict what the normal
labor force participation rate for women will be under these circumstances
of rapid social change. While there have been changes in female labor force
participation rates in other nations, it is common knowledge that no one
would want to be a female job seeker in two of our major competitors: Germany
and Japan.
Secondly, the rapid growth of the labor force is in part caused by the
fact that the age distribution of the u.S. population has a big bulge in
its distribution. This bulge is presently in the age range of between 25
and 44 years of age. It is a direct result of the labor force entry of the
post-World War II "baby boomers" (those born between 1946 and 1964). Of
the nation's population in 1986 of 241,596,000 people, a total of 76,127,000
were in this age cohort (or 31.5 percent of the total population). More
specifically, the age 25 to 34 cohort totals 42,984,000 persons. It grew
by 15.4 between 1980 and 1986. The age 35 to 44 cohort contains 33,143,000
people and it grew by a whopping 29.0 percent between 1980 and 1986.
Regardless of gender or race, these cohorts of the population have the highest
labor force participation rates of the entire labor force (i.e., all persons
age 16 and over). If ever a person is going to seek work, it is most probable
they will do so between the ages of 25 and 44 years. Fortune magazine has
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dubbed this population distribution as being "demography's glad tidings"
for the economy. The age distribution of the population currently affords
the U.S. economy the potential for a significant productivity bonus. Thus,
the bulge is a "good" problem to be confronted with -- especially when its
implications are compared to the time when this bulge was in its youth (pre-
1980) or what lies ahead when it enters its retirement phase (post-2001).
The combined effects of the growth in female participation and the
population bulge in the prime labor force participation age cohort have
contributed to a singularly important characteristic of the contemporary
U.s. labor market. Namely, the overall labor force participation of the
noninstitutionalized population over age 16 hit an all time high of 64.6
percent in 1986. The comparable rate for 1950 was 59.7 percent; for 1960
it was 60.0 percent; for 1970 it was 61.0 percent; and for 1980 it was 64.1
percent. Never in the country's history have so many persons -- in both
percentage and absolute terms -- sought to work. Moreover, it is likely
that both are going to continue to increase even more in the decade ahead.
It means for policyrnakers that this country must run just to keep even in
the need to, create job opportunities.
There is, however, one very frightening counter-trend that is buried
in the euphoria over the rising labor force participation rate of the overall
U.s. population. It has been the persistently lower labor force participation
rate of black males relative to white males. Historically through the 1940s,
the black male labor force participation rate consistently exceeded that
of white males. But since the 1950s, the white male rate has passed the
black rate and the gap between the two has widened considerably. By 1985,
the white male rate exceeded the black male rate by 6.2 percentage points
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(77.0 percent to 70.8 percent). The gap exists for every age cohort (see
Table 7). All things being equal, there is no reason why white males should
have significantly higher participation rates for every age cohort than do
black males or should have a considerably higher overall rate. But, of
course, all things have not been equal. Blacks are clustered
disproportionately in the inner cities of about 12 major cities plus being
scattered over large areas of the rural South. Jobs in general have
frequently become scarce in these areas. But jobs are especially hard to
find if one has few skills and little education and if there are limited
opportunities available to acquire or to develop latent abilities. Qualifying
for the jobs that are available is made more difficult if there are lingering
practices and practitioners of racial discrimination. Under these conditions,
an inordinate number of black'males apparently have despaired from seeking
work in the regular economy. There is, of course, an ominous societal
implication to these low black male participation rates. Namely, if adult
black males are not at work, or in school, or in the military, what are they
doing to survive? It certainly seems that an urban sub-class of minority
adult males who function outside the regular labor market has formed and
institutionalized its existence through irregular activities such as crime,
alcoholism, and drug addiction.
Yet there remains even one more factor that is causing the U.S. labor
force to grow at such a rapid pace. It is immigration. Since the mid-1960s,
immigration has slowly re-emerged as a key characteristic of the U.S.
population and labor force. In vivid contrast to other advanced industrial
nations with whom the U.S. competes, the United States stands virtually alone
in its willingness to admit each year hundreds of thousands of legal
Table 7: Male Labor Force Participation Rates by Race and Age, 1985
Race
Age Cohort White Men Black Men
16 years and over
16 to 19 years
16 to 17 years
18 to 19 years
20 to 24 years
25 to 54 years
25 to 34 years
25 to 29 years
30 to 34 years
35 to 44 years
35 to 39 years
40 to 44 years
45 to 54 years
45 to 49 years
50 to 54 years
55 to 64 years
55 to 59 years
60 to 64 years
65 years and over
65 to 69 years
70 years and over
77 .0
59.7
48.5
71.2
86.4
94.8
95.7
94.9
96.5
95.7
95.9
95.5
92.0
94.2
89.7
68.8
80.8
56.4
15.9
24.6
10.7
70.8
44.6
29.8
60.0
79.0
87.8
88.8
88.5
89.2
89.8
91.3
88.0
83.0
86.3
79.4
58.9
68.6
47.7
13.9
21.0
9.4
Source: Employment and Earnings, January 1986, pp. 155 and 156.
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immigrants and refugees for permanent settlement as well as to tolerate mass
abuse of its laws by an even larger annual number of illegal immigrants.
Indeed, a 1986 study of contemporary American society commissioned by three
large u.s. corporations (i.e., American Express, Sun Oil Company, and Bristol
Myers) and conducted by an international team of scholars (i.e., Oxford
Ana1yetica), boldly proclaimed that "America's biggest import is people."
Its detailed analysis, which generally documents "the decline in American
exceptiona1ism," found the one feature to distinguish the current u.S. economy
from those of other industrialized nations is that "immigration continues
to flow at a rate unknown elsewhere in the world." This observation, as
significant as it is, was made before the passage of the Simpson-Rodino Act
of 1986 whose liberal amnesty and family reunification provisions will
guarantee that immigration levels for at least the next decade will soar
to still higher heights than have ever been imagined before. Japan accepts
no immigrants and very few refugees. Most of Western Europe pursued
"guestworker" policies in lieu of seeking permanent immigrants to meet labor
shortage in the immediate post-World War II era. Since 1973-4, these
questworker policies have largely been abandoned and little encouragement
is given for new immigrants. Most of these nations have taken even stronger
steps than the United States to discourage illegal immigration. Thus, these
competitor nations have not had to accommodate massive numbers of immigrants
during the past decade when they too have witnessed the transformation of
their economies. It is also certain that they will not be confronted with
the massive immigration flows that the United States faces in the coming
decade.
The 1980 census revealed that the size of the nation's foreign-born
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population had not only reversed its 50-year downward decline but it had
also sustained a quantum increase. As a group, the reported foreign-born
population rose from 9.6 million in 1970 to 13.9 million persons in 1980
(an increase of 45 percent) after having declined during each previous decade
since 1920. No other grouping of the personal characteristics of the
population increased by a larger percentage between 1970 and 1980 than did
the foreign born. The 1980 Census also disclosed that one of every 10 people
in the country spoke a language other than English at home. As it is certain
that there was a substantial statistical undercount of the illegal immigrant
population by the 1980 census, even these official findings were surely
understated. Given the momentus immigration developments since 1980, it
is certain that the foreign born population to be recorded by the 1990 census
will show another quantum leap -- maybe even as high as an 80 percent increase
over the current decade. For this reason, the demographer Leon Bouvier has
observed that "immigration now appears to be almost as important as fertility
insofar as U.S. population growth is concerned." Since population changes
are transmitted to the nation's economy through labor force changes, Bouvier
warned that "there is a compelling argument for close coordination between
the formulation of employment and immigration policy." So far, his pleas
have gone unheeded.
As if the shear numbers of immigrants and refugees entering the United
States were not important enough, the composition of this flow is of even
greater consequence. The overwhelming majority of the legal immigrants,
illegal immigrants, refugees of the past decade have come from less
economically developed nations. This trend will certainly continue well
into the 1990s and their numbers will swell to even higher heights as a result
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of the various amnesty provisions of the Simpson-Rodino Act. The four amnesty
programs provided for in this Act will not only allow millions of former
illegal immigrants to legalize their status, but it will eventually also
allow their spouses, children, and parents to be admitted without numerical
limitation. Most of the immigrants from all of these sources are going to
be unskilled, poorly educated, and lacking in their ability to speak English.
Most will be from minority groups who already have inordinately high
unemployment rates. Thus, at the very moment that the nation is confronted
with the necessity to launch extensive programs for skill retraining,
educational upgrading, and worker relocation for citizen workers caught in
the structural transformation of the labor force, it must also face the
imperative for massive remedial programs to provide basic skills and literacy
training.
Immigration is the one aspect of labor force growth that public policy
should be able to control but to date it has not done so. The design of
immigration policy -- in all of its forms -- is still dominated by the pursuit
of purely political objectives and it has yet to be held accountable for
its sizeable economic consequences.
The Internationalization of the Economy
Despite the popular tendency to cite Adam Smith's classic text The Wealth
of Nations as the gospel of free enterprise, a review study of U.S. economic
history will show that the nation's economy was not built by adherence to
his blueprint. In fact, the course has often been diametrically opposed
to those principles. Such is especially the case with his advocacy of free
trade. Only one year after the federal Constitution was adopted in 1788,
the United States adopted its first tariff as a revenue source. Subsequently,
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Alexander Hamilton argued in his famous Report on Manufactures for the need
for additional tariffs to protect and encourage native industry. His tariff
proposals were ultimately adopted following the close of the War of 1812.
They continued to be in place and tended to be increased at regular intervals
until the protectionist spirit reached its peak in 1930 with the adoption
of the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff. It raised tariffs to the highest levels
ever adopted. In no way can it be said that the U.S. economy was built on
the Smith's pre-industrial revolution concept of free trade.
Instead of listening to the followers of Adam Smith, there was a popular
school of American economic writers in the 19th Century who openly supported
the tariff policies. They provided the intellectual support for the policies
that were followed. They vehemently argued against what they called the
"imported pessimism" of English laissez faire economics. After all, the
teachings of Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo promised that,
while competition would cause resources to be efficiently allocated, the
result would be only subsistence levels of living for the labor force. It
was this dismal theme of the eventual pauperization of the population, of
course, that Karl Marx adopted as his rationale that free enterprise
capitalism was doomed. The influential American writers -- who were not
academics--rejected this scenario. Instead, they believed that with its
abundant lands, vast natural resources, and low population, it was not
necessary for the pessimistic classical views to prevail in the United States
-- especially if foreign competition could be kept out.
Fortunately for the United States, only academic homage was paid to
Adam Smith during the 19th Century. In actual practice, the industrialization
of the U.S. economy proceeded behind the shield of high protective tariffs.
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The process was greatly enhanced also by the active support of the federal
government in the development of the nation's transportation system and in
the construction of the necessary infrastructure for commerce to flourish.
The gods of the economic pantheon of the United States are Alexander Hamilton
and Henry Clay whose international and domestic economic policies were those
that this nation actually followed during its industrialization phase.
It was in the 1930s, the United States began the process of backing
away from its protectionism -- which, by all standards, had gone to far with
the high rates enacted by the Smoot-Hawley Act. The reciprocal tariff
reductions of the New Deal era, however, were carefully negotiated reductions
with specific nations. You reduce yours and we will reduce ours. It was
not a period of wholesale abandonment of protectionism. World War II
interrupted this trend. During the war, the productive capabilities and
capacities of the U.S. economy increased dramatically. Moreover, the other
major industrial powers of the time were devastated by the destruction of
the fighting. The United States emerged from the war as the leading
industrial power in the world. In 1950, the United States accounted for
50 percent of the world's total production of goods and services. It was
from this position of unrivaled strength that the United States began to
abandon its protectionist tradition on a wholesale basis. The United States
was the leader in the achievement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade that was signed in 1947 but it was not until the Trade Expansion Act
of 1962 that the actual process of general tariff reductions commenced.
This led to the "Kennedy Round" in 1964 and later the "Geneva Round" in 1979,
that actually produced significant tariff reductions. As a consequence,
U.S. exports have increased sharply but so have imports. Manufacturing in
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the U.S. has sustained the greatest impact of this new competition. By the
1980s, 70 percent of U.S. manufacturing industries have direct foreign
competition. Agriculture has been the biggest beneficiary although it too
is now confronted in the 1980s with mounting competition both at home and
abroad.
It is not the purpose of this paper to elaborate on the merits or
demerits of the new free trade atmosphere that has permeated the U.S.
industrial environment. Rather, it is only of consequence to note that most
other nations have adopted export driven economies that often are part and
parcel of formally adopted industrial policies. Frequently, their exports
involve items that receive strong government subsidies and marketing support
while they seek to shield their own non-exporting industries from imported
goods. Most other nations -- especially the more industrialized nations -
- have assumed a more pragmatic strategy. They believe that their own
comparative advantages should be created and not be forced upon them by any
mystically revealed process provided by of the market place. They seek to
control their destinies while the United States seems content to shroud its
future in uncertainty and cliches.
In the United States, industrial policy is still opposed on ideological
grounds (because it does entail economic planning). Thus, the phemomena
of international competition has contributed to the entirely new economic
environment. The United States is the largest single market place in the
world and it has been the natural magnet for most other nations to seek to
penetrate. Without a comprehensive human resource policy in place to meet
the readjustment consequences of this new era of relatively freer trade and
with no historical experience to provide guidance, many communities and many
30
workers (white collar and blue collar) have had to fend for themselves.
Thus, the growth of international trade is itself a prominent factor
in the transformation of the demand forces that are presently operative in
the U.S. economy. While there may be real benefits for free trade to the
Americans in their role as consumers, it is doubtful that it is unequivocally
good for Americans in their capacity of being workers and managers. In the
world of economics, there are always costs as well as benefits associated
with actions. If free trade is to continue to be a goal, it cannot be based
simply on the nonexistent ideals of textbooks. It must be crafted and
modified within the context of an industrial policy that provides some
direction as to where the economy is going and accompanied by a parallel
human resource policy that can provide the retraining, educational up-grading,
and relocation assistance to workers as well as provide the general community
readjustment assistance needed to ease the transitional process.
The Impact of Science and Technology
Science and technology are usually assumed to be exogenous influences
in the economic analysis of labor market operations and the associated
discussions of appropriate public policy options. The longer this naive
perspective is retained, the more certain it is that the process of garnering
support for the needed labor force adjustment processes will be delayed.
To maintain the prosperity that the nation has generally enjoyed since the
end of World War II, it is essential to see that technology and science are
re-shaping the basic character of this economy and that of most other nations
around the world. Referring specifically to the hiatus between theoretical
assertions and the reality of events, the economic historian Walt Rostow
lamented in 1986 that "there is not one mainstream economist who knows how
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to talk about the technological revolution." Given this stark appraisal
of the intellectual bankruptcy of the nation's economic profession, it is
not really surprising that the American political scene seems baron of leaders
capable of understanding the radical changes that are occurring in the labor
market or who are prepared to set a policy agenda to meet the challenge of
transition.
Suffering from no illusion of being a mainstream economist, I wish to
make the case that the United States has entered the age of applied science.
Machines are now capable of performing sensory, thought, and control functions
and to do them automatically. As opposed to the evolutionary manner in which
the United States adjusted both to mechanization in the 19th Century and
to continuous process in the early 20th Century, it is doubtful in the age
of applied science that the adaptation of the labor force and of the economy
can be accomplished with such relative ease. Instead, the labor force is
confronted with the actual existence of a major discontinuity. The central
character of the evolving new order is the computer and its role in the
production of the nation's goods and the provision of its services.
Aside from the unique set of domestic and international circumstances
that have previously been discussed, the computerization of the economy is
itself a cause of monumental changes. One key difference from the past has
been the speed by which the work place is being computerized. It took over
one hundred years for the steam engine to come into general usage. For much
of that time, enterprises that relied upon windmills and water power were
able to overlap and to successfully compete with enterprises that used steam
power. Likewise, the introduction of electric power was stretched over at
least 50 years. There was time for institutional adjustment.
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The first computer was built in 1946; the first non-military sale of
a Univac I computer was in 1951 (to the Bureau of Census); and the first
commercial sale to private industry was in 1953 (to the General Electric
Company). Computers have subsequently gone through four distinct generations
of development -- from vacuum tubes, to transistors, to integrated circuits,
to the very large scale integrated computers of the present era and is poised
to enter the fifth generation of knowledge information processors capable
of performing reasoning functions. Even as we talk today, developments are
occurring with superconductors that are made from new ceramic materials that
may make it possible to connect transistors on a chip in a supercooled
computer. If successful, this step forward will be on a par with the
historical technological leap that occurred when the transistor was introduced
in 1948. These developments in superconductors are illustrative of the
unprecedented speed by which technological break throughs are occurring.
Just two months ago, the American Physical Society hastily convened a special
conference of physicists that was held just across the street at the N.Y.
Hilton to report on these new developments in superconductivity. The N.Y.
Times described the events of the conference as follows: "No sooner was
a breakthrough announced than it was obsolete and only the coming of dawn
yesterday ended what participants called the most extraordinary scientific
meeting in memory." One attendee was quoted as saying "its a phenomenon
itself -- there's never been anything like it in the history of physics."
Aside from what is on the near horizon for computer technology, I.B.M.
announced its new line of powerful desktop computers on April 2, 1987. At
the debut, one of its executives exclaimed: "If the auto industry advanced
this fast since 1981, today we would have cars that go from zero to 60 in
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three seconds, circle the globe on a tank of gas, and cost half as much as
they did six years ago. Of course, they would be difficult to get into
because they would be only half the size."
With sales in the computer industry of nearly $100 billion in 1987,
no one knows how many computers are in operation in the United States. What
is known is that the pioneering Univac I has been in the Smithsonian Museum
for over 20 years. There is little if any, room for pre-computer technologies
to overlap in this era. It is computerize or perish. The speed of computer
development has given society little time to prepare its new labor force
entrants. The typical worker entering the labor force in the mid-1980s in
the United States can expect to change jobs six or seven times and occupations
three times over their working lives. In this environment of accelerating
technology, the demand for labor is being reshaped. On the labor supply
side, there is essentially chaos. College curriculums everywhere are in
turmoil over their mission; vocational education programs cannot keep their
faculties or instructional equipment up to date; and primary and secondary
schools seem to be at a loss to know whether they should stress teaching
basic fundamentals or reasoning, or values, or articulation skills. The
same sense of bafflement seems to characterize the business and labor
organizations in terms of what they expect education and training institutions
to do to prepare their workers and members. In physics there is a law of
motion that says, "the greater the speed, the greater the impact." Al though
there is no formal parallel law in the social sciences, it is likely that
the same principle applies. The faster the speed of social and economic
change, the more severe the impact on the capacity of society's institutions
to adjust.
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In addition to speed of development, the computerization of the work
place has also brought a breadth of employment impact that is unknown in
previous periods of technological change. The steam engine, as revolutionary
as it was, exerted its major impact on employment in factories and
transportation. Many other advances in mechanization had effects on specific
industries. But the advent of computer technology has touched virtually
every industry and occupation. Mechanization and continuous process
technology were primarily eliminated the physical effort associated with
work. Computers, however, have introduced an ability to process information.
When properly used, computers can do things faster and more accurately than
human beings and they seem capable of infallibly taking into account the
countless rules associated with the production process.
In this context, it makes no sense to even try to discuss examples of
the breadth of computer applications. For every listing or description
is quickly rendered obsolete by new accounts that are often more startling.
Suffice it to say, that computer technology is finding its way into virtually
every industry and most occupations, in the public and private sectors, and
in the military and non-military sheres of the economy. Essentially any
job in the entire occupational heirarchy that is based on "yes" or "no"
decisions can be computerized. Particularly vulnerable are less skilled
jobs but many middle management jobs are also being affected. Moreover,
in the high echelons of business and government major decisions are being
based more on the statistical analysis that computers make possible and
significantly less reliance is given to human intuition. At no time in the
history of technology has any previous innovation had such a broad
applicability as that of the computer.
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Likewise, the momentum for creating new and improving current
applications of technology is increasingly dependent on a new source of
invention: science. The steam engine of the original mechanization era
was not the product of scientific discovery. In fact, it is often said that
the development of science owes much more to the steam engine than the steam
engine did to science. James Watt and the other mechanically-minded men
associated with the perfection of the steam engine had no understanding of
the thermodynamics that were involved in the machine they developed. The
related physics and engineering all came afterward. Performance came before
understanding. Likewise, the introduction of continuous process production
as pioneered by Henry Ford had nothing to do with science. It was essentially
a revolution in industrial organization. The automobile and the airplane,
for example, developed without any real scientific theory during their
formative years.
It has only been in the 20th Century -- especially since the end of
World War II -- that science has assumed an influential role as a source
of inventions. Indeed, the line between science (knowledge) and technology
(application) has become blurred. It would, of course, be a mistake to
consider science as a substitute for technology. But technology has --
through applied research -- become a virtual science itself. New inventions
and discoveries are increasingly the products of the scientific laboratories
of universities and private corporations or both working collaboratively.
In 1986, almost $120 billion was spent on research and development -- or
almost 3 percent of the nations gross national product.
In elementary economics texts, it is taught that what is produced is
the result of response to the desires of the consumer. It is called "consumer
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sovereignty" and it is alleged to be the ignition device that drives a free
enterprise economy. But anyone vaguely aware of the history of the computer,
or superconductors, or laser weaponry, or gene splicing knows that these
and many other major technological accomplishments are not the product of
consumer demands or of venturesome entrepreneurs. To the contrary, they
are the fruits of the expenditures of billions of dollars on research and
development activities devoted to meeting preconceived goals and specific
objectives. They definitely are not the fruits of spontaneous market forces.
Often prodded by national defense interests or logical advances in the current
state of knowledge in a field, the accomplishments are the results of
determined efforts of the government (especially at the federal level) and
the oligopolistic private sector. Frequently, they are both involved
together. Problems are identified and research is undertaken to resolve
them.
During early eras of technological change, the breakthroughs that
provided practical applications for the economy were typically "flashes of
insights" that came from "talented tinkers." Although it is an
oversimplification to give all credit for certain inventions to one person
(since frequently they only provided the last critical revision of the work
of many unhearlded predecessors), it is clear that most of the technological
contributions of earlier periods were made by production-oriented men with
little or no scientific training. In the United States experience, it is
worthy to note that Eli Whitney (inventor of the cotton gin and a pioneer
in the development of interchangeable parts production methods) was originally
a private tutor for plantation children; John Deere (inventor of the steel
plow and numerous other farm implements) was a blacksmith; Issac Singer
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(inventor of the sewing machine) was a machinist; Charles Goodyear (discoverer
of the process needed to vulcanize rubber) was a failed-hardware merchant;
and Samuel Morse (inventor of the telegraph) was a portrait painter. Thomas
Edison, a pioneer electrical inventor, represents the transitional case from
the past to the present. Edison, as a child, dropped out of school after
only three months. He had a strong distaste for mathematics and no formal
scientific training. Nonetheless, though extensive self-study over his
lifetime of the scientific literature, he was able to exploit the discoveries
of others for practical and commercial applications. It was Edison who set
up the first laboratories and promoted the concept of teamwork among his
assembled researchers. They produced inventions that received 1,300 patents.
In so doing, Edison and his associates set the pattern that is now the
practice. Today, instead of relying on the work of a few wise men who were
generalists, a research industry has evolved. It is composed of tens of
thousands of specialized scientists who work on a scale and to a degree of
organization never imagined only a few decades ago. In the 1960s, Robert
Oppenhemier once said that 9 of every 10 scientists who have ever lived were
alive and at work in their laboratories at that time. If anything, the
percentage is likely to be even higher today. A community of scientists
has been formed who, through the use of experimental methods that do not
need to validate broad principles, have created a host of narrower
specialties.
With the financial support of government and industry and relatively
free from the opposition of political and religious authorities (that hampered
scientific investigation in the past in the Western World and still does
in many parts of the Eastern World in the present), there has been a veritable
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explosion of knowledge. Illustrative of this growth is the fact that the
Library of Congress reports in 1986 that it is adding 40,000 items
~
day -
- or 3 items a second -- to its collection.
There are current estimates that the body of worldly knowledge is
doubling every five years. Earlier in this century the famed sociologist
Lester Ward could teach a class at Brown University entitled "A Survey of
All Knowledge." Today, it has become virtually impossible for any college
instructor to even prepare an adequate summary of existing knowledge in any
single discipline.
The acceleration of knowledge has been combined with substantial economic
incentives to put this information to use. The knowledge is there so why
not try to apply it. Often a workable technology can lead to further
scientific understanding -- especially when financial gain is possible.
Consequently, science has often become an endogenous activity of
technologically-driven economies like the United States. Hence, the labor
market is expected to adjust to the requirements of rapidly introduction
of new technologies and scientific possibilities. It is increasingly unlikely
that this adjustment can occur without labor market dislocations. This is
because the new technologies place entirely different requirements on the
labor force than has historically been the case. The older technologies -
- associated with mechanization and continuous process -- created millions
of unskilled and semi-skilled jobs. They did not ask very much of the labor
force in the way of skills or education. The jobs could be learned in a
few moments, hours, or days. Moreover, thanks in part to our labor movement,
the gains in productivity associated with these jobs were often rewarded
with salaries and benefits that far exceeded what many workers with few skills
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and little education could earn elsewhere.
With computer technology, an electronic mind has been created for
coordinating, guiding, and evaluating most routine operations. Consequently,
the introduction of a vast array of mechanical substitutes for the human
neuTo-muscular system and it is now possible to link these new computer-driven
machines together into self regulating systems that can perform an enormous
variety of tasks. Consequently, as Norbert Weiner -- the father of
cybernetics -- warned 30 years ago: "Let us remember that the automatic
machine, whatever we think of any feelings it mayor may not have, is the
precise economic equivalent of slave labor. Any labor which competes with
slave labor must accept the economic conditions of slave labor." As a
consequence, he added, "in all important respects, the man who has nothing
but his physical power to sell has nothing to sell which is worth anyone's
money to buy."
Thus, the new technology of today means that high paying jobs for poorly
skilled and inadequately educated workers are largely a thing of the past.
As Secretary of Labor Brock aptly said earlier this year, "the days of
disguising functional illiteracy with a high paying assembly line job are
soon to be over. The world of work is changine right under our feet." The
new technology is creating new jobs millions of them -- but the growth
is most likely to be in occupations that reward extensive training and
education. It is unlikely that there will ever again be an abundance of
unskilled jobs -- but, unless things change dramatically with regard to labor
force preparation, there is almost certain to be a chronic excess supply
of unskilled job seekers.
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Concluding Observations
The United States is entering a revolutionary period in terms of an
economic transformation in the means of production, the conditions of
international competition, and the changing domestic economic environment.
Collectively, they have raised question about the ability of the labor force
to adjust. The answers to the problems of the past appear to have little
relevancy to the present. The same can be said for the past paradigms of
the operation of the economy. As the causative factors for this
transformation are essentially national in scope, they require a national
response. The federal government is the only logical level to provide the
leadership that is required. But all societal institutions with a stake
in employment must be involved. One of the more insightful explanations
for economic progress in industrialized nations during the last half of the
Twentieth Century has been the recognition of "human resources as the wealth
of nations." Countries with limited physical resources, such as Japan and
Germany, have sustained superior economic performances in this new era largely
because they have been forced, by lack of alternatives, to develop their
human resources. Other industrialized nations have realized that the human
resource development of their labor forces is the key to efforts to resolve
simultaneously such difficult issues as efficiency, equity, stabilization,
and growth. Reliance on tax cuts -- such as has been done in the United
States and Great Britain -- are obviously not the proper route. Fiscal policy
is important. But without a parallel policy of equal prominence that focuses
on the labor supply side, the exercise of fiscal policy remedies is likely
to be insufficient and, potentially even harmful to the quest for full
employment.
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The overarching difference between the state of human resource
development policy in the United States and that of other major industrial
democracies is philosophical. In other nations, the underpinning of their
human resource endeavors is the belief that all accidental victims of social
and economic change are a societal responsibility. It is society's obligation
to train (or retrain), to educate (or reeducate), to relocate; or to
compensate those workers who find themselves unemployed or underemployed
through no fault of themselves. In most instances, these nations have adopted
some parallel forms of national economic planning and/or industrial policy
that includes necessary labor market adjustment policies as key elements.
But in the United States, the tendency is to place the responsibility on
individuals and local communities to respond to these changing economic
conditions on their own. There is little or no national economic planning
(except in the special areas of national defense and national highway
construction). There is an aversion to economic planning in general and
to human resource planning in particular. Reliance upon individual and
community adjustment to the conditions of the marketplace remains the policy
norm -- especially in the 1980s. There is periodic political talk during
election years about the need to re-order national "priorities" (which is
the language embodiment of the planning ideal) but there have been no steps
at the national level to formalize the procedures necessary to establish
an agenda artd to rank any such set of national priorities. The political
power (or lack of it) of vested interest groups to exert lobbying strength
to achieve ad hoc objectives remains the modus operandi for setting and
pursuing most non-defense related economic objectives.
Without specifying the details, the broad outlines of the need of human
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resource policy for the nation would include three components. They are
a salvage role (for those who are still unprepared to find employment); a
preventive maintenance role (for those who have jobs but who may lose them
do to changing technology or international competition); and a long term
educational development strategy (to develope a highly literate work force
that is flexible and adaptable to rapidly changing circumstances).
Any serious effort to formulate a national human resource policy that
is designed to be congruent with meeting long term economic needs must
ultimately be linked to some degree of national economic planning. To this
end, there is an implicit need for the adoption of an overall industrial
policy for the nation of which comprehensive education and training policies
would be a vital component. Although the topic is controversial, there can
be little purposeful long term preparation of the labor force for employment
if there is little direction provided as to where the economy is thought
to be going.
The challenges to public policy formulation in the United States are
formidable. But as Oliver Wendell Holmes once said "the mode through which
the impossible comes to past is effort." It time to try.
